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The added value of the proposal by Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis lies in 
that it deals with the serious problem of the Greek institutions’ weakness in 
implementing reforms. The authors come up with a concrete and intelligent idea, which 
goes beyond the narrow-minded perspective of economic austerity. 
However, the proposal should carefully address the risk that the new recruits have a 
“double loyalty”: to the Greek State and to its creditors. In this case, the extraordinary 
recruitment programme, instead of representing a factor for institutional improvement, 
could delegitimise and further weaken the Greek political, bureaucratic and judiciary 
institutions. This would be tantamount to placing the Hellenic Republic directly “under 
administration” – an unacceptable as well as detrimental circumstance. In order to avoid 
the risk of a conflict of loyalties, the status of the new civil servants should be carefully 
regulated by appropriately balancing their guarantees with the prerogatives of the 
government. Therefore, it will be crucial that (1) the recruitment procedure be managed 
directly by the Greek government and that (2) the subsequent employment relationships 
be permanent. 
Along with this extraordinary measure, in order to structurally improve the institutional 
capacity of the Hellenic Republic, it would be vital to foster forms of training for the 
ordinary civil servants as well as to strengthen the National  School of  Public 
Administration and Local Government. 
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